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Abstract 
The Federal Communications Commission currently utilizes a simultaneous 
multi-round ascending bid auction to allocate Personal Communication Services 
licenses. In the auction, participants are allowed to withdraw standing bids at a 
penalty. The penalty is equal to the difference between the price at which the bid 
was withdrawn and the highest bid after the withdrawal. The withdrawal rule was 
added to the auction design to assist bidders wishing to assemble combinations of 
licenses who may find themselves stranded with an assortment of licenses for which 
their bids sum to more than their value. This paper reports results of experiments 
that examine the effect of the withdrawal rule in environments in which losses can 
occur if packages of licenses must be assembled piecemeal. The experiments 
demonstrate that there is a tradeoff with using the rule: efficiency and revenue 
increase, but individual losses are larger. Furthermore, the increased efficiency 
does not outweigh the higher prices paid so that bidder surplus falls in the presence 
of the withdrawal rule. 
THE EFFECT OF BID WITHDRAWAL IN A 
MULTI-OBJECT AUCTION 
David P. Porter 
1.0 Introduction 
Milgrom (1995) describes the auction process the Federal Communications 
Commission uses to allocate licenses for Personal Communication Services (PCS).1 
The PCS auction uses a simultaneous multi-round ascending bid auction to allocate 
the licenses. Specifically, each participant simultaneously submits sealed bids for 
each license they wish to bid on and the high bids become the standing bids for the 
next round of bidding. This basic design has many features that were considered 
important for the efficient allocation of licenses. In particular, the feature that all 
licenses in a Block2 were offered simultaneously, i.e. all license markets closed at 
the same time, allows bidders to take into account interdependencies among 
licenses. With all markets being opened and standing bids revealed, bidders can 
switch among substitute licenses. Bidders who have complementary values among 
licenses can observe the sum of the standing bids and determine whether they 
should bid for several licenses. As pointed out by Milgrom, this is similar to a 
Walrasian adjustment process in which participants use current prices across 
markets to adjust their demands to find a general equilibrium outcome. 
Aside from the general simultaneous multi-round design there are many 
important additional rules used in the PCS auction. These include stopping rules 
and methods to make the auction "converge quickly" .  The final PCS auction design 
imposed the following additional rules: 
1. Participants have to make significant upfront payments which restricts their 
eligibility.3 This rule forces commitment by participants and provides a 
strong incentive not to default since the upfront payment would be lost.4 
1 For more background on the PCS auction design sec McMillan ( 1994 ). 
2 The FCC identified groups of licenses. classified by geographic location and MHz offered, which were defined as 
a particular Block. 
3 Eligibility defines the total MHz times population on which a participant can tender bids. Licenses are defined 
by MHz and a geographic location. (which has an official population). Thus, eligibility constrains the number and 
type of licenses on which a participant can submit bids. 
4 There have also been special bidding credits and financing that have been extended to specific bidders 
(designated entities). The special financing arrangement seems to have contributed to the large premium paid in 
the Block C auctions (see Wilkie (1996) for details). 
2. A set of rules that restricts the eligibility of bidders is used to speed-up the 
auction. Specifically, in order to be able to submit a bid in the round a 
participant must have been active in the previous round. To be active a 
p articipant must have submitted an acceptable bid in the previous round or 
have had the standing bid two rounds previous. In order for a bid to be 
acceptable in a round, it had to be at least higher than the standing bid for the 
item by more than a specified amount. 
The auction also uses stages which restricts a bidders eligibility. Specifically, 
stages are used to restrict the number of licenses, through individual 
eligibility constraints, on which a participant can bid. The restriction is 
based on a number /... � 0 which constrains a participant to bid for at most (1 ./...) 
times: 5 (1) the "number of licenses" for which the participant submitted 
acceptable bids in the previous round and does not currently have the 
standing bid plus (2) the "number of the licenses" for which the p articipant 
had the standing bid 2 rounds previous but no longer has the standing bid. 6 
3. Participants are allowed to withdraw any of their standing bids before a 
round begins. After such a withdrawal, the bid is lowered and held by the 
FCC and becomes the standing bid. An individual who withdrew his bid pays 
a penalty equal to the maximum of the difference between the amount of the 
bid he withdrew and the highest bid submitted after his withdrawal or zero. 
4. The process stops when all bidders have no eligibility remaining. When the 
process stops, the items are awarded to the participants with the standing 
bids . Withdrawal penalties are then paid at that time. 
It is the withdrawal rule that is the focus of this p aper. The history of the 
withdrawal rule (see Milgrom ( 1995)) arose from bidders whose business plans 
called for assembling combinations of licenses. These bidders complained that the 
simultaneous multi-round piecemeal bidding for licenses posed a serious problem 
for them. If they bid aggressively for a combination of licenses, they might find 
themselves the high bidder for a subset of those licenses for which their values are 
low. In response, a rule ch ange was suggested that would permit bidders to freely 
withdraw bids . The reasoning for this form of the rule was to allow for more 
aggressive bidding and thus higher efficiency and revenue. However, this form of 
withdrawal eliminates commitment in the bids and thus the monotonic aspect of 
auction surplus. Another early suggestion for a withdrawal rule was to allow bids to 
be removed at the auction close. However, if a bidder removed a bid at the close of 
the auction, he would have to withdraw all his bids and the items would be offered 
5 As the auction moves to a new stage the number z is reduced until it is close to zero. 
6 In addition, the participant could always bid on those items for which he currently had the standing bid. 
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to next highest bidders. These ideas were abandon in favor of the form described 
above which was offered by Preston McAfee. 7 
The effects of this withdrawal rule are hard to predict. From an individual's 
standpoint, the possibility of withdrawal allows a bidder to be more aggressive,8 to 
try dangerous fitting strategies at lower risk, and to (maybe) avoid losses incurred 
"by mistake". From a strategic point of view, (i.e. ,  when the reactions of the other 
players .are also considered), some of these benefits may disappear. Losses occur for 
sure only when prices are high and the end of the auction is near, in exactly those 
cases in which few participants are left to bail the loser out when activity rules are 
present. However, it is still possible that the apparent reduction in risk will 
increase efficiency and revenue at the cost of increased losses. A second strategic 
effect is less benign. The lowering of the risk of loss could lead an opponent to try 
to drive the price of an item up to force you to give it up and, more importantly, 
because of that to release another item at a loss. This type of strategy can lower 
both efficiency and revenue. What will really happen remains to be studied. 
2.0 Some Withdrawal Data From the Regional PCS Auctions 
2.1 Regional Narrowband Auction 
In the Regional Narrowband Auction 30 licenses were auctioned 
simultaneously. The licenses consisted of six frequency bands (two 50 kHz out­
bound/return and four 50 kHz out-bound/12.5 kHz return)9 in five regions (North 
E ast, South, Midwest, Central, and West) of the US. In addition, for one of the 
50/50 licenses for each region and one 50/12.5 for each region, preferences were 
given to small businesses, and women- and minority-owned bidders. These bidders 
received 40% discounts on those licenses. There were only two withdrawals in the 
entire auction. The auction lasted for 104 rounds and the withdrawals occurred in 
round 78 for the ·50/12.5 West region license for which the 40% discount applied and 
round 83 for a 50/12.5 South region license. Figure 1 shows the final bids and 
withdrawn bids for the South and West regions. The main item that stands out is 
the 2 . 1 million dollar penalty paid by Pagemart for a license it did not receive. The 
data from this auction shows that several bidders were trying to assemble 
nationwide coverage by bidding on similar licenses across all five regions. This 
license aggregation bidding behavior suggests that a synergy value (superadditive 
values for combinations of licenses, specifically nationwide coverage) existed for 
these licenses. Milgrom (1995) argues that the withdrawal behavior and 
7 Notice that there is a continuum of withdrawal penalties that may "do the trick" with less exposure to the 
individual withdrawing. Specifically, the penalty could be a(W) where 0 �a� 1 and W is the penalty described 
in 3. Thus, when a= 1 we get the McAfee penalty and when a= 0 we get the original withdrawal "penalty" 
proposal. 
8It lowers the expected cost of not acquiring a piece of a package in a simultaneous auction. 
9 The 50/50 licenses allow for two-way paging. 
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subsequent penalty resulted from a strategic play by a bidder rather than a bidder 
being "stuck" by not obtaining their desired aggregation of licenses. The strategic 
behavior described by Milgrom resulted from a bidder parking himself in an 
unwanted license in order to main his eligibility without getting into a bidding war 
for the license he did desire. While waiting for the "smoke to clear" and hiding his 
true demand in an unwanted license the bidder ended-up needing to withdraw in 
.order to bid for his desired license. It is not clear whether this strategy was prudent 
given the penalty paid.10 The one bit of analysis that cannot be made is whether 
the existence of a withdrawal rule exacerbated this outcome by reducing the cost of 
hiding, i.e., allowing a bidder to "unload" from a miscalculation. 
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The FCC conducted a much larger auction in which 2 identical (identified as 
Blocks A and B) broadband frequencies were offered in 51 Major Trading Areas· 
(MTAs) as defined by Rand-McNally Commercial Atlas. Bidders could only obtain 
one of the two licenses per MT A. The auction lasted for 1 12 rounds and unlike the 
10 McAfee and McMillan(l995) provide an aggregate analysis of this auction. 
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narrowband auction withdrawals occurred "often" (a total of 2 1  withdrawals were 
tendered in rounds 18, 27, 66, 81,  82, 87, 97, 98, 102, 104, 108 and 109). Figure 2 
shows the pattern of withdrawal across the licenses for which withdrawals were 
tendered. The figure shows the withdrawn and winning bids for each auction. 
Many times the bidder who withdrew his bid ended up with the winning bid for the 
item at the price he withdrew (see Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Kansas City, 
and Alaska). For six licenses (Philadelphia, Miami, Louisville, San Antonio, 
Columbus, and Tulsa) the final bid was above the withdrawn bid. For- five licenses 
(Minneapolis, Tampa, Houston, Memphis, and Oklahoma City) Wireless Co. paid a -
withdrawal penalty on each, for a total of over $14 million in withdrawal penalties. 
It is also interesting to note that multiple withdrawals were tendered on the same 
licenses (see Houston, Oklahoma City and Alaska). 
Figure 2: 
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Salant (1995), supplies an analysis of this auction from a bidder's perspective 
in his experience with GTE. He suggests that the withdrawals and penalties stem 
from a budget constraint problem faced by Wireless. Salant does not elaborate on 
the nature of the budget constraint problem faced by Wireless Co. Salant also 
admits that he was confused by the pattern of bidding from Wireless who, among 
other strategies, bid on both A and B licenses, as did others, in the same MTA. 
Ausubel et al. (1996) estimate an econometric model from the final bids in 
the auction with several variables to account for value synergies. They find no 
significant synergies from the estimates of their model. This suggests that the 
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withdrawals were related to strategic behavior such as hiding, signaling to reduce 
demand, etc. or bidding errors. 
Which strategies are used in the face a withdrawal policy are unclear. In 
addition, the effect of the withdrawal rule on bidder losses is uncertain since no 
comparative data is available without the withdrawal rule. The only definitive way 
in which to get a handle on these issues is through controlled experiments. This is 
what we turn to next. 
3.0 Economic Environments and Experimental Design Issues 
This section describes the economic environments that confronted the 
subjects in the experiments. Several issues that were encountered in the design of 
the experiments due to the complexity of the auction mechanism and the potential 
loses that could be suffered by subjects will also be presented. 
3.1 Base Economic Environments Covered 
All of the environments reported in this paper are derived from the following 
generic setup. A set of n objects, labeled x11 • • •  , xn are to be allocated to m agents. 
Agent i's profit function is vi (xlii····•Xni) where xki =1 if and only if agent i is 
awarded item k. Thus, an agent knows what they will be paid if they successfully 
acquire any particular subset of the items. In some cases below, subjects are 
supplied common information about aspects of others' values. In other cases agents 
will know nothing a priori except their own valuations . 
Max 
x 
. . 
In this class of environments the most efficient allocation solves the problem: 
subject to 
xfi = 0 or 1; and 
L x,, = 1 for each i 
Two classes of environments are examined. The first class examines 
superadditive values for multiple units of a homogenous good. The second class 
looks at an environment in which preferences are spatial, i.e., subjects have 
superadditive values for specific combinations of objects. 
6 
3.1.1 Homogenous Goods with Superadditive Values 
Items in this environment are homogenous, i.e., V;(x1;, .... ,xn;) = V;(,Lxif). The 
j 
demand for these items are assumed to be superadditive for some participants, i.e. , 
V;'(,Lxj;) � 0. An example is given in Figure 3 below.11 There are eight 
j 
participants. In the figure, each step represents a participant's marginal return 
function for the first three units. The marginal return for more than 3 units is ·zero. 
Notice that in this environment there is no single price equilibrium. As soon as 
bids go over 100, losses must occur. When price is above 100, bidder 5 for example, 
might then withdraw his bid and accept any price above 70. This result occurs 
because the mechanism does not allow nonlinear pricing. Thus, either the outcome 
must result in losses or at least one bidder must forgo the pursuit of potentially 
profitable opportunities. 
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11 In many of the superadditive environments several of the subject did not have superadditive values. This was 
done to examine the bidding behavior of non-synergy bidders. See Appendix B for the actual environments. 
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In the experiments, subjects were provided with the following common 
information about their environment: the number of units being auctioned, the 
number of participants and who had the standing bid on which items. The subjects 
did not know the distribution over which the values were drawn or even if a sirigle 
price could clear the market. 
3.1.2 Spatial Fitting Environments 
The spatial fitting environment has the property that for some J* c {x1, x2, .. , 
Xn}: 
L V:(xi) < V(J*) 
x1EJ• 
Specifically, the following method was used to determine individual values. There 
are 6 heterogeneous items (which are label as a,b,c,d,e, and f) to be allocated 
among 5 participants. The values over the items were established by: 
i. The single item packages labeled a,b,c,d,e and f have their integer values 
drawn independently from the uniform distribution with support [O, 1 0]. 
ii. The two-item packages {a,b}, {a,c}, . . . . . . .  . ,{e,f} have their integer values drawn 
independently from the uniform distribution with support [20,40]. 
m. The three-item packages {a,b,c} ,. . . . . .  . ,  {d,e,f} have their integer values drawn 
independently from the uniform distribution with support [110,140]. 
iv. A single value for the six-item package {a,b,c,d,e,f} is drawn from [140, 1 80]. 
A total of 25 unique packages, from the total possible, are generated from i-iv above 
and are given to participants. The main point to note is that two three item 
packages clearly form the largest aggregate value. However, this optimal package 
configuration is likely to be overlapped by many other competing packages. The 
task of the mechanism is to guide the owners of the components of the optimal 
allocation to find each other. In Table 1 below the values for one particular draw 
from the experiment are shown. Notice that bidders 5 and 2 have the optimal 
fitting packages. 
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Table 1: 
Values for Auction 1 
Bidder 1 Packages: f cd bcf bde abe !Optimal Fit 
Values 9 22 128 130 120 
Bidder 2 Packages: b df ae af GM1 
Values 8 28 24 27 130 
Bidder 3 Packages: c a d bd abf 
Values 2 3 8 20 119 
Bidder 4 Packages: e abc adf bdf aef 
Values 10 117 128 °125 
Bidder 5 Packages: cf de bef abcdef 
Values 29 25 117 125 142 
Subjects were given common information concerning how the values were 
drawn along with the number of participants and who had the standing bid on 
which item. 
3.2 Experimental Design Issues 
There are two major issues to confront in the implementation of theses 
experiments. First, the actual process used by the FCC is very complex and it is 
subjective when to move to new stages of the auction. A simplified version of the 
mechanism was chosen so that the effect of withdrawal could be examined without 
peripheral issues. Second, since losses are possible, measures are required to 
ensure that control is not lost when losses grow for an individual and there is no 
credible means to enforce payment. 
3.2·.1 The Auction Mechanism 
The auction· process used by the FCC is very complicated.· In Ledyard et al. 
( 1996a) experiments using the FCC rules required extensive training on the part of 
subjects to become familiar with the rules. In addition, the process took significant 
time to conduct. Fortunately, Ledyard et al . (1996a) also conducted continuous 
versions of the FCC auction. That form of the auction was easier to manage and 
also resulted in better efficiency in their experiments relative to the FCC batch 
design.  One can think of the continuous case as a limit to the batch case when 
there are no activity rules. 
The auction used in the experiments allows participants to submit bids on 
any of the items at any time the auction is open. Only the highest bid on each item 
is posted. A standing bid may not be withdrawn without penalty. A new bid must 
better the standing bid in order to replace it. Thus, it is a standard English auction 
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process but with all markets open at the same time. Bid withdrawal was allowed in 
this auction using the following penalty rule: 
Participants were allowed to delete any of their standing bids. After such a 
withdrawal, the price of that item was dropped to zero and that bid became 
the standing bid of the experimenter. An individual who withdrew his bid 
paid a penalty equal to the maximum of the difference between the amount of 
the bid he withdrew and the highest bid submitted after his withdrawal or 
zero. 
All of the markets closed simultaneously when no new bid was placed in any of the 
markets after 1 5  seconds. 
This auction form has no subjective issues relating to moving to new stages.12 
In addition, unlike the batch process with activity rules, everyone is active as long 
as the market is open. Thus, when a withdrawal occurs there is a full market to 
accept the withdrawal. With activity rules, there is a strong possibility, in this 
design, that when a participant withdraws a bid those that could use the unit 
would be inactive. Thus, this auction form has the best chance of enhancing 
efficiency. The tradeoff is of course is that cycling may occur in the continuous case 
since withdrawal is not a costly act in terms of eligibility. Since Ledyard et al. 
· ( 1996a) did not see this cycling occur often, it is a tradeoff that is accepted here. 
3.2.2 Bankruptcy 
It is easy to see that the potential for losses is a strong possibility in the 
design. To reduce the possibility of bankruptcy and its effects, two direct sources of 
earnings to offset ,losses were added. First, everyone was given 5 dollars of working 
capital at the start the experiment and had two dollars. added to their working 
capital account at the end of each auction. In addition, in the spatial environment, 
four more goods ·were added into the environment whose values were completely 
additive.  That is, for these items, individual values were such that 
v; ( x k , x 1 ) = v; ( x k ) + v; ( x 1) • Subjects knew that these markets were not related at all 
to the sp atial markets. These additional markets allow us to provide more earnings 
to subjects to offset losses and allow us to see if the mechanism works as advertised 
in these simple markets without any strategic spillover from the spatial markets. 
12 Cull and Bykowsky (1996) provide some analysis that suggests that the FCC stage III activity rule was too 
restrictive in the MT A auction and biased the prices paid by bidders. 
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3.3 Design Summary and Procedures 
All of the experiments were conducted at the California Institute of 
Technology using the student population as the subject pool. Instructions for the 
experiments can be found in Appendix A. The continuous market was 
computerized13 and withdrawals were listed on a board for all to see. All of the 
subjects had been in previous unrelated economics experiments and were familiar 
with the general software. In addition, a full practice period was used to let 
everyone become familiar with the market and related accounting 'procedures. · 
Each experiment consisted of 5 auctions. Subjects confronted the same auction 
institution and rules for each period but their values were redrawn for each auction 
period. Subjects were recruited for 2 hours and did not know that only 5 auctions 
would be conducted. Each experiment lasted less than 1 hour and 45 minutes. The 
table below summarizes our 2x2 experimental design of environments and auction 
withdrawal rules. 
Table 2 
2 2 E  x xperimenta ID es1e:n 
Homogenous Superadditive Spatial 
Superadditive Values Environment 
Environment 
Auction with Bid 15 Auctions* 20 Auctions 
Withdrawal 
Auction without Bid 15 Auctions 20 Auctions 
Withdrawal 
* An auction is one realization from an experiment sequence of 5 auctions. Thus, in the 
homogeneous environment 3 experiments per treatment were conducted and for the spatial 
environment 4 experiments were conducted (for a total of 14 experimental sessions). 
4.0 Experim-ental Results 
In this section two major aspects of the performance of the mechanisms are 
examined: economic efficiency and individual losses. An examination of withdrawal 
behavior and bid dynamics is also performed. 
4.1 Efficiency Loss Tradeoff 
Since we are working in environments where value is measured in terms of 
profit, efficiency is defined as the aggregate value achieved by the mechanism as a 
13 The Multiple Unit Double Auction software (see Johnson et al. (1989)) was used with subjects restricted as buyer 
only. 
1 1  
percentage of the maximum possible. Since only relative performance is considered 
in our design, no time will be spent discussing the parameter scales in individual 
values. Losses are simply defined as the negative earnings, in dollars, made by 
subjects at the end of an auction. 
4.1.1 Homogenous Superadditive Case 
The -table below shows the descriptive statistics for efficiency and losses 
across each treatment. 
Efficiency and Loss Statistics 
Treatment Mean Standard Deviation 
(Efficiency, Loss) (Efficiency, Loss) 
Auction with Bid (98. 72, 1.62) (1.64, 1.34) 
Withdrawal 
Auction without Bid (97.53, 1.38) (1.85, 1.42) 
Withdrawal 
Observation 1: The withdrawal rule results in higher efficiency. 
Suonort: The table below shows the results of two non-parametric tests to see if 
the efficiency distributions are the same for each treatment. 
Test of Equality of Distributions of Efficiency 
. .  
Test Statistic P-Value 
Kolmogorov Smirnov D=.467 .0991 
Mann-Wh.itney z=l.97021 .0488 
Observation 2: Efficiency outcomes are slightly more volatile without 
withdrawal but the difference is not significant. 
Suooort: Differences in the variance of each of the treatments were tested and 
an F statistic = 1.274 was obtained ,  which is not significant at the 10% level. 
Observation 3: The withdrawal rule results in higher losses, but the difference 
is not always significant. 
Support: The table below shows the results of two non-parametric tests to see if 
the loss distributions are the same for each treatment. 
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Test of Equality of Distributions of Losses 
Test Statistic P-Value 
Kolmogorov Smirnov D=.2667 .2512 
Mann-Whitney z=.7519 .4520 
Observation 4: Losses are slightly more volatile without withdrawal but the 
difference is not significant. 
Suooort: Differences in the variance of each of the treatments.were tested and 
an F statistic = 1.117 was obtained, which is not significant at the 10% level. 
Next to see if there is a '1earning" influence, behavior across auctions within 
an experimental session is examined. Figures 4a - 4d below show the time series 
for each experimental session. From these figures we see: 
• Each sessions looks distinct. Each group has its own character. 
• When there is no withdrawal rule, losses are lower in the later auctions which 
suggests that bidders are less aggressive after losses. 
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Figure 5 shows the revenue and bidder surplus for various auctions (auctions 
1and3 and auctions 2 4 and 5 are grouped together since they have similar 
environment parameters). From this graph we make the following observation: 
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Observation 5 :  The gain in efficiency isn't always large enough to overtake the 
losses and thus bidder surplus is reduced. Thus, the seller is made b etter off since 
revenues are higher but this is at the expense of bidder surplus in many cases. 
4.1.2 Spatial Environment 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for efficiency and losses 
across each treatment. The bivariate distribution of loss and efficiency shows a 
bimodal distribution with (efficiency, loss) outcomes located at (100%, $0. 50) and 
(60%, $10 .00). This is similar to results found in Banks et al. (1986) in which 
coordination failures for the funding of a public good resulted in no provision or 
optimal provision when unanimity was required. 
Efficiency and Loss Statistics 
Treatment Mean Standard Deviation 
(Efficiency, Loss) (Efficiency, Loss) 
Auction with Bid (72.5, 9 .16) (21.27, 7.44) 
Withdrawal 
Auction without Bid (62 .6, 6 .55) (16.52, 3 .90) 
Withdrawal 
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Observation 6: The withdrawal rule results in higher efficiency. 
Support: The table below shows the results of two non-parametric tests to see if 
the distributions are the same for each treatment. 
Test of Equality of Distributions of Efficiency 
Test Statistic P-Value 
Kolmogorov Smirnov D=.3000 .1301 
Mann-Whitney z=l.4877 .1368 
Observation 7: Efficiency outcomes are slightly more volatile with withdrawal 
than without withdrawal, but not significantly. 
Support: Differences in the variance of each of the treatments were tested and 
an F statistic = 1.65 was obtained, which is not significant at the 10% level. 
Observation 8: 
used. 
The withdrawal rule results in higher losses than when it is not 
Sunnort: The table below shows the results of two non-parametric tests to see if 
the distributions are the same for each treatment. 
Test of Equality of Distributions of Losses 
Test Statistic P-Value 
Kolmogorov Smirnov D=.3500 .1010 
Mann-Whitney z=l.231 .2180 
Observation 9: . Losses are more volatile with withdrawal. This suggests that 
losses are likely to be higher for a group that cannot coordinate when the 
withdrawal rule is present. 
Sunnort: Differences in the variance of each of the treatments were tested and 
an F statistic = 3.645 was obtained, which is significant at the 5% level. 
The time series of each experiment can be found in the figures below. The 
data shows: 
• Each group seems to have its own character. 
• The Auction 3 parameters result in high efficiency and low losses across both 
treatments. 
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In this environmen t the resul ts are stark. When a group cannot coordinate, 
i .e., fitting bidders canno t find each o ther quickly, then major losses and low 
efficiency can occur with the withdrawal rule. Figure 7 shows the revenue and 
bidder surplus for each auction. 
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Figure 7: 
Consumer Surplus and Revenue: Spatial Environment 
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From thii? graph following observation is made: 
Observation 10: The gain in efficiency isn't large enough to overtake the losses 
and thus bidder surplus is reduced. The seller is made b�tter off since revenues are 
higher but mainl}'.' at the expense of bidder surplus. 
4.2 Withdrawal Behavior 
4.2.1 Withdrawals, Efficiency and Losses 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between efficiency and the number of 
withdrawals tendered in each auction. In the spatial environment, there is a 
negative relationship between withdrawals and efficiency, i.e. more withdrawals 
signals low efficiency. 
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Figure 9 shows the relationship between the number of withdrawals 
tendered and losses for each auction . In the spatial environment there is a positive 
relationship between the number of withdrawals and the eventual losses. This 
suggests that many withdrawals signals poor coordination and thus looming losses 
when fitting is an issue. 
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4.2.2 Synergies and Coordination 
4.2.2.1 Homogenous Superadditive Environment 
Recall that in some of the auctions (2, 4 and 5) several bidders did not have 
superadditive values. In each of these auctions , those bidders never withdrew a bid 
or m ade a loss. Thus, if one sees withdrawals in these experiments it is entirely 
due to superadditivity. 
4.2.2.2 Spatial Environment 
In the spatial environment, four markets were created in which values were 
strictly additive. These markets should pose no problem for most mechanisms. In 
fact we would expect that prices should be at the second highest value (the 
competitive equilibrium) . In these non-spatial markets the deviation from the 
competitive equilibrium prices is charted in Figure 10 .  It should be noted that in 
these m arkets 100 % efficiency was obtained in 38 out of 40 auctions and there was 
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never a withdrawal tendered in these markets. The mechanism worked as one 
would expect and no strategic retaliation was noticed that filtered into these 
markets from the spatial markets. 
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Figure 10: 
CE Price Deviation in Non-Spatial Markets 
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While the competitive equilibrium (CE) outcome is a good predictor of 
outcomes in the simple markets it does not do so well in the spatial market. In 
some of the auctions (1 ,3  and 5) it happens that there is a set of prices that can 
clear the markets. That is , one can solve the following set of equations for pj :  
Vi(Xji*) - LJ pj � 0 for each i and for J � N where x/ is the optimal allocation, and 
Vi(Xji) - LJPi _:s 0 for all J � N and i where Xji = Xji* 
Figure 1 1  shows the CE price deviations for these cases. It is clear that this is not a 
good predictor of the outcome in these auctions. 
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Figure 11: 
CE Price Deivation in Spatial Markets 
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4.2.2.3 Path Dependent Losses 
e Withdraw 
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Too see how biding and withdrawal can go awry, two specific auctions are 
illuminating. In Series 1 Auction 5 a large loss ($1 7) was observed. In the previous 
aµctions in that series the losses were low and efficiency was high. What occurred 
is that bidder 4 .decided, after the first auction, not to bid in the spatial m arkets . In 
all the auctions except Auction 5 ,  this bidder was not p art of the optimum. Thus he 
did not provide any noise. in the bids and the optimal p ackages could find each 
other (only 2 withdrawals were used in Auction 1 through 4). However, in Auction 
5 that bidder was part of the optimal allocation. His failure to participate resulted 
in the large loss and 7 withdrawals were tendered in that auction. 
Figure 1 2  charts the withdrawals in Auction 4 Series 2 ,  the auction which 
sustained the highest losses. Each bidder withdrew at least once and each item had 
at least 1 withdrawal. For items a,b,c e and f, the item ended up with the bidder 
who withdrew at the highest price. Thus, no penalty was paid on those items, but 
two penalties were paid on item d ($3 .50 and $3 .70). One interesting bit of 
information came from bidder 4 who obtained items a and e.  These items had no 
value to him without item b (he sustained a $10 loss); next to auction 4 on his 
accounting sheet he wrote: "Played wrong. Should have bid for b,  no matter how 
high!" 
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Figure 12: 
Withdrawal Behavior in Auction 4 Series 2 
90 
I I I I I I • I I I I 
80 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 70 I I - .  I I I I I I I I I I I I 
60 I I I I I I I I I I •Bidder 1 I •I I 35 I 
I • 
A I I I � I I A o Bidder2 '""! 50 A I I I I I () I • • .s I I I I I A Bidder 3 � I I I I <> I <> 
·c 40 I • I t I A Bidder4 i:i.. I I I • I I I I I I •Bidders A e I I I I I 30 A .t. I I • I A I I I I e I A I A I I I I I 
20 I I • I I t I I I 37 I I I 
i I 
I 
10 I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 
ctl ctl ctl ctl .0 (..) "O "O QJ QJ QJ - - -
Market 
5.0 Conclusions 
The main result is that there is a tradeoff when using the withdrawal rule. 
Allocative· efficiency may increase but individual losses increase and total bidder 
surplus is reduced. In environments where fitting and coordination are not 
p aramount, such as the homogenous case with superadditive preferences, the 
mechanism seems to work well. When preferences are such that fitting and 
coordination are crucial, the mechanism does not perform well. 
In these experiments, participants who submitted bids on withdrawn items 
were typically "inactive", i.e. they had not submitted a bid for a over a minute prior 
to the withdrawal. Several times, these inactive bidders won the withch·awn items 
and added to total surplus. Thus, if one wants to use a simultaneous multi-round 
ascending bid auction with withdrawal and activity rules to allocate items, then to 
increase efficiency, when a bidder withdraws a bid, everyone should be able to bid 
on the item regardless of their eligibility status. That is, when a withdrawal 
occurs, bidding is open for that item . 
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Beyond this simple fix however, it seems that when preferences have spatial 
properties a better mechanism needs to be designed. Mechanisms that allow for 
combinatorial bidding may be the best option. Banks, Ledyard and Porter (1989) 
describe one particular mechanism that seems to do well. This mechanism has 
been investigated further in Ledyard et al. (1996ab). Ausubel (1996) suggests an 
ascending bid extension of the now famous Vickrey (1961) auction.14 His suggestion 
of the extension to Vickrey's auction is incredibly complex and difficult to 
implement even in a very simple testbed. Rothkopf et al. (1995) suggest a method 
that reduces the combinatorial complexity while attempting to maintain the 
efficiency properties of a full combinatorial auction. How it is implemented is an 
open question. 
14 Rassenti, Smith, Bullin (1982), provide an extension of the Vickrey auction with combinatorial preferences, but 
they only consider only a one-shot sealed-bid version of the mechanism. 
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Appendix A 
Instructions 
You are about to participate in an economics experiment. The decisions you 
make in the experiment will result in earnings in U.S. currency which will be yours 
to keep. In this experiment all transactions will be stated in francs. You can convert 
your franc earnings into U.S. dollars at a rate of francs to 1 dollar at the end of 
the experiment. 
The experiment will be broken-up into a series of periods. At the beginning of 
each period you will be given a Redemption Value Sheet. This sheet describes 
the value to you of decisions you might make. Do not reveal this information to 
anyone. 
How To Read Your Redemption Value Sheet 
A Redemption Value Sheet is a list of packages of items (the items are labeled 
as A, B C and so forth) and its value to you in francs. Below you will find a generic 
Redemption Value Sheet with four packages listed. 
Table 1 :  REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET 
ITEMS in VALUE in 
PACKAGE FRANCS 
A 100 
B 67 
D 35 
BD 2 10 
Thus, if you were allocated Item A you would get 100 francs in Value. If you 
obtained items A, B and D your total value would be 3 10 ( 100 + 2 10) in this 
example. The amount you get to keep will be the difference between the Value you 
obtain from items allocated to you and the cost of obtaining those items. 
YOUR PROFIT = Value of Items 
Redeemed 
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Cost of Items 
Obtained 
How the Redemption Values are Determined 
You will b e  one of 5 participants in this market. At the beginning of a period each 
participant will be given a set of packages and associated redemption values for the 
packages. The set of packages and values, from which yours will be selected, are 
determined as follows: 
1 .  Each .of the single-item packages (a, b, c, d, e, f )  will have their values taken 
independently from the interval [0, 10] . Each value in this interval will be equally 
likely to be selected. 
Example: Package a gets the value 4 Package b get the value 7 .  
2 .  The experimenter will select 7 of the 15 two-item.packages (ab, ac, ad, . . . .  ,ef) 
which have their values taken independently from the interval [20,30] . Each value 
in this interval will be equally likely to be selected. 
Example: Package ce gets the value 2 7, Package de gets the value 2 1 . 
· 3 .  1 1  of the 20 three-item packages will be selected and their values will be drawn 
independently from the interval [1 10 , 130] all of which are equally likely. 
Example: Package abc gets the value 1 1 1 , Package cde gets the value 125 .  
4 .  The p ackage abcdef will have its value drawn from the interval [ 140, 180] all of 
which are equally likely. 
Summary to this Point 
• There will be a total of 25  packages (6 single-item packages, 7 two-item 
packages, 1 1  three-item packages and 1 six-item package) generated each period 
to be distributed among the six participants each period. 
Each participant will be assigned 5 of the packages. Thus, no one has duplicate 
packages. 
• The values for the packages were determine as follows: 
Single-item package values are selected from the interval [O, 10] -
Two-item p ackage values are selected from the interval [20 ,30] -
Three-item package values are selected from the interval [ 1 10, 130] -
Six-item p ackage value is selected from the interval [140 , 180] 
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The Allocation Process 
Items will be allocated through a market process in which you can submit 
bids (in francs) for items you want. The process starts when the market is opened. 
You are then allowed to submit bids for any of the items. Only the highest bid for 
each item is posted, which we call the standing bid. The only way for your bid to be 
registered for an item is to submit a bid for that item that is higher than the 
standing bid. The market for the items will close if no new standing bid for any item 
is registered within __ seconds: 
· · 
In addition to bidding in the market, if you have a standing bid for an item 
you will be able to withdraw your bid for a potential penalty. When a bid is 
withdrawn its price is set to zero and can be bid for by participants in the market. 
The individual who withdraws a bid will pay a penalty equal to: 
The Maximum of {O or 
The difference between the bid withdrawn and the 
highest bid for that item after the withdrawal 
Example 1 :  
Bid 
Item F 345 � Bid Withdrawn 
0 
200 
245 
Close � Penalty = 345 - 245 = 100 
Example 2 :  
Bid 
Item F 345 � Bid Withdrawn 
0 
200 
245 
Close � Penalty = 0 
When the market closes those holding the standing bid will be assigned those 
items and will pay their bid for the item. In addition, participants will p ay any 
withdrawal penalties at that time. 
Profit = Value of Items 
Redeemed 
Standing 
Bids 
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